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SUMMARY 
 
The paper argues the need of public policy in support of the innovative entrepreneurship in 
Bulgaria. This issue receives special importance in the context of final stage of country’s 
integration to EU and expected membership in 2007. In 2000 the European Council has 
defined in Lisbon its objectives for 2010 the Union “to become the most competitive and 
dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth 
with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion”. It stated that a friendly environment 
for starting and developing businesses is central to reaching these goals. The importance of 
entrepreneurship has been reaffirmed in the EU Commission's 2003 Spring Report to the 
Spring European Council, and later has been developed into policy strategy in the Green 
Paper Entrepreneurship in Europe, adopted by European Commission in January 2003. In 
particular, the Green Paper outlines four key contributions of entrepreneurship:  
 Entrepreneurship contributes to job creation and growth, and it fosters social and 
economic cohesion for regions whose development is lagging behind; 
 Entrepreneurship is crucial to competitiveness 
 Entrepreneurship unlocks personal potential 
 Entrepreneurship answers societal interests, providing societies with wealth and 
diversity of choice for consumers; it plays a positive role in delivering health, 
education and welfare services efficiently. 
Bulgaria has passed through the one of the most difficult and painful transition from 
administrative socialist economy to the market economy. For almost a decade in the country 
has been established a specific kind of rent-seeking and assets-scraping capitalism imposed 
by political nomenclature of former Communist party. It eroded the industrial and knowledge 
base, undermined the initial enthusiasm and entrepreneurial spirit of people, and prevented 
country’s rapid integration in global economy by consciously imposing barriers to the foreign 
direct investment. The real reforms in the country started only in 1997 and it was not until the 
last several years when Bulgaria reversed the negative trend of its economic development 
making steady progress towards integration in Europe Union. 
The paper argues that in current situation encouraging entrepreneurship and providing better 
economic and institutional environment for the existing innovative SME is one of the most 
effective ways to boost economic development, create employment opportunities and 
improve competitiveness of Bulgarian economy. It is based on empirical study of the 
innovative small and medium private firms in the sectors of Innovation & Communication 
Technologies and Perfumery & Cosmetics. The findings make possible to outline key 
problems of the innovative entrepreneurs as potential bearer of 'technological renaissance' in 
the country, to define the objectives of relevant public policy and propose policy actions in 
the field.  
The present paper include the following proposals: 
- Launching special campaign in public media promoting entrepreneurship; 
- Advancing development of venture capital in the country; 
 1
Ivan Tchalakov, 2003 IPF Fellow   Final report – Policy paper 
2044-ECN-TCH-BG 
- Strengthening research and education infrastructure in the regions, where the clusters 
of innovative SME in specific sectors have been established; 
- Support of local administration in developing capacities to assist development of 
innovative entrepreneurs 
- Improving institutional capacities and human potential of branch associations of 
entrepreneurs and inducing changes in their strategies;  
- Initiating (or providing support where it exists) collaboration between branch 
associations in given sector or between those in related sectors  
- Empowerment of entrepreneurs' Branch associations by transferring to them some of 
the government responsibilities in steering economic development in the sectors  
 
BACKGROUND  
 
This section intends to shake some of the well-established views about economic transition in 
Bulgaria by adopting entrepreneurial viewpoint on the events that took place during last 
fifteen years. It argues that unlike Central-European countries, the ‘velvet revolution’ in 
Bulgaria was actually used by specific wing in Communist party nomenclature to transform 
its political power into economic one. This wing preserved control over practically all sphere 
of Bulgarian society until the late 1990s. One of the main features of this period was the 
suppression of the initiative and entrepreneurial spirit of people, explicit attack against 
independent entrepreneurs and imposition of a negative public image of entrepreneurs.     
During the post-socialist transition the innovative entrepreneurs in Bulgaria have been 
working in hostile economic and political environment of rent-seeking and assets-scrapping 
capitalism. This specific form of capitalism originated from the events that took place in the 
last decade of socialism. It was marked with intensification of the struggle between two main 
wings of communist nomenclature – “political” and “economic” ones.1 The political 
nomenclature comprised the members of organizational and ideological departments of 
communist party together with special services as their ‘right hand’ (including those 
monitoring foreign trade with the West). It possessed the main asset (or ‘capital’) for steering 
every field of society – control over the ‘cadres’, the appointment and promotion of relevant 
people on key positions. With the reforms that have been gradually introduced in Bulgaria 
since late 1970s the dominant positions of political nomenclature have been challenged by 
the increasing power of economic nomenclature, i.e. the ‘cadres’ managing the economy -
from the lowest position of directors of the enterprises, through the managers of the large 
vertically integrated state ‘combines’, to the heads of economic ministries and their officers. 
The later has developed its own sense of unity, its own ‘industrial ethos’ and managed to 
establish itself as a group opposed to the political nomenclature. From this point of view the 
history of the higher echelon of Bulgarian Communist Party was marked by several big 
clashes between these two wings, each time the political nomenclature taking over the 
economic one. This happened first at the end of 1960s with the dismantling of legendary 
economic cartel “Bulgarian See Fleet” (former TEXIM), when the founder and chief manager 
of the cartel Georgy Naydenov was prosecuted and put in jail under false accusations. The 
same happened in early 1975, when Prof. Ivan Popov – the man who initiated the successful 
                                                 
1 More on internal tensions of communist nomenclature see in: Boundjulov, A. 2003. ‘What Emerges in the 
Place Of? Artificial Joints and Networks Under Socialism’. In: Historical sociology of socialism: special issue, 
Sоciological Problems 1/2 (in Bulgarian). 
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development of electronic industry and later became deputy Prime Minister and member of 
Politburo – was dismissed from all his positions and send ambassador to Switzerland. Their 
high recognition in Bulgarian society, especially among industrial managers, threatened the 
power of party’s organizational and ideological departments, including top leadership of the 
country.  
However, the economic nomenclature recovered soon and by early 1980s it managed to 
create a special organizational structure, the Bulgarian Industrial Economic Association 
(BISA), which copied the structure of Japanese federation of industrial branch organizations.2 
BISA became very popular with its initiatives aimed at optimizing the economic 
development. It backed the attempts to relax administrative control, to allow small-scale 
private property in industry and agriculture, to enforce foreign economic relationships with 
Western corporations, etc. Remarkably one of these initiatives was to boost the development 
of small and medium enterprises and to endorse them with bigger autonomy in comparison 
with other socialist economic organizations. Some these SME resembled Western spin-off 
firms – they have been build on indigenous innovations or used licensed Western 
technologies.3  
On the eve of the radical changes in November 1989s, the economic nomenclature was 
defeated again. In December 1988 Ognyan Doinov – the most popular economic leader in the 
country and highly respected among Bulgaria’s Western economic partners - was dismissed 
as member of Politburo. Similarly to the cases of Georgy Naydenov and Ivan Popov, his 
removal was a sign the same to be done with his followers in economy, state and party 
apparatuses. The economic power was taken again by political nomenclature.  
So unlike Hungary, it was the political nomenclature – whose representatives in his vast 
majority considered the economy through the optics of old Marxist political economy and 
lacked specific industrial managerial skills – which was destined to carry out post-socialist 
economic transformation in Bulgaria.  
Instead of opening door to the foreign investors, to empower the most talented industrial 
managers and to promote entrepreneurial spirit among the economically active population, 
which for more than 50 yeast have been deprived from the very conditions to became 
entrepreneurs (property rights and fair access to credit), the representatives of political 
nomenclature did just the opposite. Seeking to preserve their dominance in society the 
‘reformers’ adopted a strategy of conversing their political capital into economic one. They 
successfully used the conservative neoclassical models the Western economic experts were 
selling after 1989 to push out the economic nomenclature from the positions it still possessed 
and to impose their own rent-seeking and assets-scraping strategies. These strategies included 
number of interrelated measures, the most important of them were:  
                                                 
2 This time the industrial managers were headed by an younger, but equally influential member of Politburo – 
Ognyan Doinov, who in late 1960s has spent five years in Japan as manager of very successful Bulgarian-Japan 
joint venture. In his memoirs Doinov wrote that BISA was established as conscious attempt to help “the true” 
industrial managers, which he considered as “the most underprivileged part of nomenclature, being under 
constant pressure of administrative system but nevertheless attempting to do their job professionally”. These 
people, he wrote, have been dispersed in their posts with no colleagues help, no consultancy available and no 
possibility to voice their opinion and defend themselves at the local and regional party authorities.”  
3 Special ordinance limited their activities to light industry only. The political nomenclature feared that these 
new forms of economic activity contained “too much capitalism”. 
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1) Gaining control over country’s financial system by appointed trusted people at now 
independent bank system (special amendment of law stipulated that bankers are not 
personally responsible for the loans they allowed!);  
2) Keeping large share of state property in industry, while dismantling former vertically 
integrated structures (state combines) and establishing stringent control over the 
industrial managers of separate enterprises (via bank system, by appointing trusted 
people, by means of specially created criminal groups, etc.).  
3) Exploitation of the state-owned plants by the schemes of so-called “input-output 
economics”, i.e. compelling their managers to buy row materials at higher price from 
specific supplier and to sell their production at lower price to specific distributor 
(usually both small trade firms, privately owned by the representatives of political 
nomenclature working in given sector).  
4) Not allowing penetration of foreign capital for as long as possible;  
5) Suppressing the emerging independent entrepreneurs from other social groups by 
limiting their access to credit and forcefully pushing them out of the most profitable 
sectors;  
6) Control over legal system by appointment of trusted people and by introducing special 
legislation with cut off the legal system from public control and accountability.  
The process of restitution, launched in 1992 that returned the property nationalized in 1947 to 
the former owners was slow, incomplete, and was successfully used as ideological coverage 
of the real economic processes that were taking place. Worst at all, the restitution mentality 
promoted by this process was practically identical with economic philosophy of political 
nomenclature. It also implied rent-seeking capitalism, focusing public attention on the 
possession of property (most of which were outdated material assets) instead on the 
opportunities for making money by new ventures and on related emancipation of credit 
system from the political system by creating conditions for fair access to credit.  Preserving 
its control over the new ‘independent’ public media, the ruling elite consciously discredited 
the emerging patterns of entrepreneurial activity. They continued to spread an atmosphere of 
distrust to private initiative and its leveling to a type of semi-criminal activity. There were 
fewer examples of successful entrepreneurs that managed to creep into the media.    
Hence the new Bulgarian state and political institutions have emerged after 1989 as 
something very different in its nature and functions from its Western analogues. They have 
not been based on principles of accountability, civil service, clear identification of policy 
objectives and the related public interests. Rather, Bulgarian political system was used by the 
winners in the battle between two wings of communist nomenclature as a shield that 
guaranteed the flawless application of their rent-seeking and assets-scraping strategies to gain 
economic superiority.4  
The results of this type of economics were hundreds of ‘sucked out’ state-owned firms – 
highly indebted, with outdated and badly maintained equipment, paying meager salaries, and 
left out by their best workers and specialists. Combined with grain shortages and high 
inflation, this has lad to the mass upheaval in the winter of 1997, preliminary elections and 
                                                 
4 That is why the ‘bandit model’ of Mansur Olson on the governments’ role in East European economic 
transformation provides appropriate framework for conceptualizing situation – the model defines the role of 
politicians and bureaucracies in post-socialist economies as 'bandits' attempting to extract maximum resources 
from the 'public' and introduces relevant variables such as the ability of the 'public' to resist, the time span of 
bandits' economic policy and the level of bandits' internal cohesion. (Olson 1995: 437-462). 
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new democratic government. The new government in few months has closed 16 ‘drained’ 
private banks, introduced currency board and launched rapid privatization program. Three 
years later the share of state ownership in the economy felt from over 70% to below 30%. 
The complete domination of ex-communist political nomenclature was finally broken. For 
few years, however, it was replaced by fairly similar in its effect ‘democratic domination’, 
where the democratic government exercised strict control over the privatization process and 
economy as whole, favoring its own party apparatus. Paradoxically enough, by 2001 it 
became clear that state and political institutions have been used again for the enrichment of 
another politically bound group.  
According to the latest surveys among business circles, it was not until the government of ex-
monarch Simeon SaxCoburg-Gotha came to power in 2001 that the state institutions adopted 
relatively neutral attitudes towards the private companies independently of their belonging to 
the groups of former ex-communist or ex-democratic nomenclature, or to those of 
independent entrepreneurs.  
The invitation of Bulgaria to became member of EU in 1998 and the ongoing negotiations 
with EC have been another important source of changes in Bulgarian post-socialist political 
system towards Western standards of behavior, including the changes in relationships 
between political and economic spheres. 
CURRENT SITUATION 
The results of our research have shown that ‘conversion’ strategy of political nomenclature 
did not succeed in full scale. There were sectors, which provided sufficient enough conditions 
for the innovative entrepreneurship to emerge, develop and grow. Their representatives came 
from different background – R&D centers in industry, industrial managers fired off by the 
political nomenclature in the years before and after 1989, ancestors of former capitalist class 
that restituted their property, or simply talented people with entrepreneurial spirit which 
seized the opportunity for business in the new economic conditions, where the private 
property was nevertheless legally admitted. 5 Being relatively invisible during the first years 
of transition and passing through the many hardships, these entrepreneurs gradually increased 
their economic strength. By uniting their efforts in newly emerging branch associations, at 
the end of the decade they begun to exert pressure on the political system to change the 
dominant model of rent-seeking capitalism.  
The result of all these developments is that in 2003 we see Bulgarian economy in rather 
unstable equilibrium between two main group of economic agents – the innovative 
entrepreneurs, on the one hand, and rent-seeking capitalists related with former political 
nomenclature together with part of restitution capital on the other. To these we have to add 
the third group of steady increasing foreign companies in Bulgaria, majority of which take 
the side of innovative entrepreneurs.  
                                                 
5 It’s worth re remind the definition form 2003 Green Paper on Entrepreneurship in Europe: “Entrepreneurship 
is first and foremost a mindset. It covers an individual’s motivation and capacity, independently or within an 
organization, to identify an opportunity and to pursue it in order to produce new value or economic success. It 
takes creativity or innovation to enter and compete in an existing market, to change or even to create a new 
market. To turn a business idea into success requires the ability to blend creativity or innovation with sound 
management and to adapt a business to optimize its development during all phases of its life cycle. This goes 
beyond daily management: it concerns a business’ ambitions and strategy.” (page 5) 
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We could tentatively define two complimentary principles, which taken together help 
differentiate the sectors ‘conquered’ by the representatives of post-communist political 
nomenclature from those were the innovative entrepreneurs have better chance to develop.  
The first principle is the overall profitability of the sector. The political nomenclature as 
defined above, focused on most lucrative sectors such as production of mass consumer goods 
for domestic market (tobacco, alcoholic beverages including vine, petrol derivatives, 
pharmaceutical products, cosmetics and household chemistry, etc.) or trade that deliver such 
goods (especially import), as well as sectors that still have competitive advantages at the 
international markets – ferrous metals, wood and wood processing industry, heavy chemistry, 
electric power industry, etc. We should add to this group service sectors such as 
telecommunications and tourism, although their specific characteristics brought about some 
long term constrains for pure rent-seeking strategies. Only few very strong multinational 
companies have been able to limit in certain extend the power of political nomenclature in 
these sectors, often with the help of Western governments and after paying serious 
concessions. However, the low-profit sectors - those producing manufactured goods or 
provide services with relatively limited demand; those having low prospects for export; those 
requiring significant investments and expensive maintenance, those with long return cycle of 
profit, etc. – remained relatively free for entrepreneurial initiative.       
The second principle is the sectors inherent resistance (or better ‘rigidity’) to the rent-seeking 
and rent-scraping strategies.  Political nomenclature might also be considered as a newcomer 
and from this point of view we could distinguish between sectors with ‘low entrance’ and  
‘high entrance’ barriers. The former did not require specialized know-how or they implied 
know-how similar in kind to that possessed by the representatives of political nomenclature 
(for example trade with consumer goods and petrol derivatives). In these sectors its 
representatives have easily taken command positions and have been able effectively to 
manage their new business. The traditional industries of mass production like ferrous metal, 
heavy chemical industry, etc. should also be included in this group, because here the ability to 
control of low-skilled employees (both in production and in system of distribution) was key 
asset, and it was relatively easy to sustain mass production at acceptable quality. Usually here 
the output consisted of low-tech products, which did not require special maintenance, nor 
developing special services to customers. In addition to that, in these sectors breaking the 
existing regulations, industrial standards, intellectual property rights, etc. was not punished 
because of submissive government institutions and hidden control of legal system.  
However, there were also sectors with high entrance barriers - where the very production 
process and specificity of the products presupposed specialized knowledge hence they used 
skilled labor and management; where the maintenance of the products and trust between 
producer and his customers (or between service provider and his clients) was crucial for the 
business. In majority of such cases it was difficult for the political nomenclature to develop 
sustainable business – for example in IT industry the most successful business of its 
representatives was to re-sell abroad the sophisticated equipment of electronics plants, 
imported previously with utmost efforts through the Western embargo…  
The comparative study of the two sectors of information & communication technologies 
(ICT) and perfumery & cosmetics (P&C) lead us to the following main points, outlining 
current situation: 
1) For the last 14 years of transition in spite of hostile economic and political 
environment in the country there emerged substantial number of vital and fast 
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developing private innovative SME, whose seek to impose their own agenda to the 
political system, and to make it better responding to their specific needs and interests.  
2) Development of innovative SME in these sectors has reached a stage of differentiation 
and specialization. There even emerged high-tech firms that specialize in providing 
innovation and engineering services to the other firms and for export.  
3) There is clear regionalization of certain types of businesses. Innovative SME in given 
sector often emerge as clusters in certain regions because of specific tradition (for 
example large enterprises from the socialist period), presence of relevant research and 
education infrastructure, local cultural or natural environment, etc.  
4) The large majority of studied innovative SME demonstrate socially responsible 
behavior towards their employees and local communities; they are correct towards 
their business and financial partners.  
5) The attitudes of local authorities and government offices towards innovative 
entrepreneurs vary from real collaboration and partnership to hostility, creating 
barriers to their development and insolent corruption.  
6) During the years of prost-socialist transition the innovative SME have been working 
in changing conditions at the internal and international markets, unpredictable 
financial and legal environment, unstable political process. At their markets the firms 
compete with Western firms and the firms of other post-socialist countries.6 Often 
their competitors receive direct or indirect support from their governments, such as 
export subsidies, protective import taxes, and subsidies in hiring employees. There is 
no such backing on the side of Bulgarian government.  
7) Working without assistance of government institutions (the later often being source of 
additional troubles), the innovative entrepreneurs managed to cope with various 
obstacles transforming their failures into source of experience and points of support 
for the next move ahead. They develop abilities to analyze and learn from their 
experience and invest continuously in new technologies, design of new products and 
services, in qualification of their employees. They are very flexible, often diversify 
their activities and enter new markets.  
8) Their business ethics deserves special admiration, because although developed in the 
hostile conditions of Bulgarian rent-seeking capitalism of 1990s, it reproduces the 
classical entrepreneurial spirit of vigor, persistence, the hard work trust and 
correctness towards the customers and business partners, etc.7 We have found in 
number of firms the children of entrepreneurs studying the same specialty at 
university with clear intention to continue one day the business of their parents.  
9) The innovative entrepreneurs have developed habits not to rely on government and 
political institutions in the business; they prefer not to enter in dialogue with these 
institutions. However, this reduced their ability to define their problems and to frame 
them in appropriate way, lead to the lack of skill for lobbying, etc. This might turn to 
be counter-productive at the present period of negotiation between government and 
                                                 
6  For example Bulgarian cosmetics firms compete with big world producers at local market and at the same 
time they compete with them and with local firms at Russian market of perfumery and cosmetics. Bulgarian and 
Romanian software firms compete at Western market of software 
7 The experience of innovative entrepreneurs sharply differs from those of representatives of rent-seeking 
capitalism, which heavily relied on political and state backing of their activities and on financial and legal 
‘comfort’ they provide – possibilities not to repay their credits, to delay social and health securities, to pay 
reduced taxes and custom duties, to break intellectual property rights, etc. That is why changes in political 
power often lead to bankruptcy among the “party” firms. 
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European Commission about economic and other conditions of EU membership. Here 
the collaboration with between entrepreneurs and government is highly needed.  
10) The majority of innovative SME realize the necessity of collective actions in 
defending their interests and those of the sector as whole. They are organized in 
branch associations, which try to impose the rules of business ethics and to elaborate 
collective positions towards those who violate these rules. The branch associations 
have developed number of activities supporting the business of their members – such 
as transfer of experience from developed countries, training in introducing good 
management practices, establishing contacts with political parties and government 
institutions.   
11) The expansion of the activities and responsibilities of branch associations poses 
serious challenges to their development – they often lack enough resources, there are 
difficulties in hiring qualified staff, etc. These and other difficulties might result in 
serous crises in their development. 
12) The innovative SME have specific needs and face different problems, which vary not 
only between sectors, but also inside the sectors. This makes the dialogue with 
government and political institutions rather difficult. The traditional arrogance of state 
officials towards private businessmen8 is another obstacle. They are not inclined to 
listen to the entrepreneurs and often are offering standard and general solutions, 
having little in common with concrete problems of firms. Key positions in 
government offices are held by people without qualification and which are unable to 
understand the problems of entrepreneurs. Frequent staff changes in these offices 
because of political and other reasons are another barrier to collaboration. 
13) Coming EU membership will bring substantial changes in the businesses in every 
sector of the economy. This is a major challenge to the entrepreneurs and they make 
serious efforts (alone or in the framework of their branch associations) to be informed 
about EU specific legislation, standards and norms that refer to their products and 
services. They invest serous resources to meet these requirements by introducing new 
technologies, systems for quality and good management practices. However, they are 
univocally assert that government officials carrying out negotiations with EU do not 
inform the business, do not talk with entrepreneurs and rarely ask for their opinion.  
 
OBJECTIVES 
 
The objectives of the policy in support of innovative entrepreneurs in Bulgaria are: 
1) To induce changes in overall public attitudes towards innovative entrepreneurship in 
the country; 
2) To strengthen the potential of innovative SME in different sectors by targeting several 
key problems of their development – knowledge base, institutional capacity of their 
branch associations; patterns of business partnership;  
3) To change relationships between political & government institutions and branch 
associations of entrepreneurs, which have been established during the last decade and 
which do not correspond to current economic changes at the eve of EU membership. 
 
                                                 
8 This is a tradition, which roots go deep in Bulgarian past, far beyond the communist period – to the times of 
state capitalism during the first half of the last century.  
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KEY ISSUES 
 
If continue, the current lack of appropriate policy supporting innovative entrepreneurship in 
the country would deepen the existing and give rise to new problems. The following issues 
are to emerge, hindering the prospects for growth: 
 Scarcity of well-qualified technical staff, university graduates and R&D specialists. The 
crisis in country’s higher and university education, cased by the persistent underpayment 
of the teaching staff and lack of investment in material base, coupled with never ending 
brain drain of best professors and students are eroding the human resources needed by 
innovative SME to sustain their high rates of growth.9 With the aging of top R&D 
specialists trained in R&D centers of former state corporations (combines) a generation 
gap appeared, which is very difficult to be filled in. There are fewer doctoral students, and 
in-house training requires years of apprenticing.  
 Continuous degradation of research and knowledge base of innovative entrepreneurship, 
especially at regional level. Like in other sectors, the newly established innovative SME 
in the field of ICT and P&C have benefited from the scientific and R&D infrastructure 
inherited from socialist period. Many of successful entrepreneurs in these sectors came 
from R&D centers. However, with the closing of these centers and narrowing the scope of 
R&D activities in the new private firms, some important areas of fundamental and applied 
research simply vanished. Traditional fields like ion implantation in semiconductors or 
synthesis of new active substances for cosmetic industry practically do not exists 
anymore. This will erode the prospects for growth of innovative firms and will reduce 
their long-term competitiveness.  
 Lack of long-term planning at firm level and lack of sectoral developmental strategies. 
The innovative firms’ limited resources and their preoccupation with immediate problems 
shorten the scope of their business projects. However, number of leading innovative SME 
have already reached a stage where the long-term strategic planning is vital necessity. The 
insufficient investments in this area, the limited use of consultancy services and feeble 
collaboration with universalities and other research establishments deepen the problem 
and makes innovative SME vulnerable to the market shifts.10   
 Growing tensions inside branch associations. Most of these associations have emerged as 
unions of innovative private SME in order to resist better to the hostile behavior of large 
state-owned firms, controlled by ex-socialist political nomenclature and ‘bandings’ from 
the government. During the last several years with government taking equal stand to 
various business groups, the external threads diminished. On the other hand, there 
                                                 
9 In certain segments of ICT sector like software the firms are sending some of their top specialists to teach at 
corresponding university specialties in order to reduce costs for individual training of poorly qualified graduates. 
10 According to the word of an university professor and top R&D expert in P&C sector: “…Most of Bulgarian 
cosmetics firms are used to rely on the ingredients and standard formulae provided by the big multinational 
suppliers. Hence they are lagging behind the leading companies - there are fewer original products developed, 
even less brand series. Then how can they go through on the European market? It is only the Russian market 
where they are still selling well, but sudden changes like 10% increase of custom duties last year make the firms 
extremely vulnerable. This is because they are targeting lower price categories and are unable to satisfy clients 
at higher price categories. The firms are using high quality ingredients, they have good production technologies, 
qualified staff and yet they are selling low price products! This is such a paradox. I think the reason is the lack 
of long-term vision. I am pleading our firms: please establish your strategic departments, set your 3 to 5 years 
objectives, create something really new aiming and fight to impose it on the market!” 
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appeared serious differentiation among the firms themselves. In P&C sector there are 
about ten big firms (both former big state firms being privatized and some of the former 
high growth SME), 30 to 50 well developing medium firms and more that a hundred 
small firms. Besides their common interests, these firms now obviously face different 
problems and challenges. This makes extremely difficult the elaboration of a common 
strategy, creates problems and even potential crisis of branch associations.  
 Closely related with the last issue is the difficult emergence of new large Bulgarian 
companies with potential to become economic actor at regional and even European scale. 
The coming mergers between larger and smaller Bulgarian firms in various sectors will 
require substantial restructuring of will shake the existing patterns of relationships both 
between the business partners and between firms and public institutions. If not faced by 
relevant public policy, this issue is burdened with serious potential conflicts.   
 
ASSESSMENT OF ALTERNATIVES 
 
Not adopting the proposed public policy equals to missing the window of opportunity to 
rabidly adapt the most promising industrial sectors to the requirements of EU market and to 
provide condition for sharp economic growth in the country. In particular 
- Degradation of knowledge base in specific sectors will continue. Some key 
competences will be lost or created anew at much higher cost; 
- Business partnership in different sectors might experience serious crises due to the 
institutional weakness of branch associations and growing tensions between 
entrepreneurs;  
- Key deficiencies in government administration and political expertise will not be 
cured; 
- The majority of population will retain it passive economic behavior of paid labor, 
awaiting someone ‘from above’ to solve its problems.  
 
PROPOSED ACTION 
 
Launching special campaign in public media promoting entrepreneurship. 
The first step in proposed policy is to set a task force of media experts, social and economic 
researchers on entrepreneurship and representatives of relevant guilds (journalists, video-
docimentalists, etc.) to design how to make public the daily life of innovative entrepreneurs. 
The success stories have to be documented, series of articles have to be published in relevant 
journals, and special TV program should be established at some of the most popular media.  
Further development of venture capital in the country 
Development of fair access to credit for the best entrepreneurial projects is crucial condition 
for promotion of innovative SME. Venture capital is relatively new and highly efficient form, 
which combines provision of purchasing power with much needed consultancy in crucial 
aspect of SME management. It is especially suitable to proposed policy. The already exiting 
institutional forms of venture capital in the country should be given public support and 
individual initiatives (so called ‘business angels’) should be encouraged. At present situation 
it is especially important to focus venture capital in two directions – assistance of larger firms 
in their efforts to establish themselves on the world market and assistance of the emerging 
innovative SME of new generation entrepreneurs as vital pool for future alternatives for 
growth. 
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Strengthening research and education infrastructure in the regions  
Based on appropriate empirical studies of the established and emerging regional clusters of 
innovative SME, special measures should be taken for improving the knowledge base of 
these regions. The simplest way to achieve this goal is Bulgarian Government clearly to 
declare its adherence to the EU target of setting up 3% share of GNP spending for research 
and higher learning. Compared with the current less than 0.5%, the doubling of public 
spending for the next financial year will give clear signal of public support for innovative 
business and will encourage entrepreneurs also to invest in research and education.  
As an additional step the collaboration between business and academia should be encouraged. 
Measures to fight bureaucracy in research institutions & universities have to be implemented.    
Support of local administration in developing capacities to assist development of 
entrepreneurs 
The existing program in support of local administration should be complemented with special 
activities aiming to train local officials to work with branch associations and to better 
understand the need of entrepreneurs. These measure have to be taken in collaboration with 
highly efficient NGOs, working in the field and which have gained prestige among local 
governments (for example Foundation For Local Government Reform). 
Improving institutional capacities and human potential of branch associations of 
entrepreneurs 
Special measure should be taken for training the staff and improving institutional capacities 
(including their material infrastructure) of branch associations. Policy initiatives shifting the 
current policies of branch associations should encouraged, by focusing on several key 
strategic objectives as complimentary to current preoccupation with short and middle term 
goals. Similar steps are needed in support of collaboration between branch associations in 
given sector or between those in related sectors   
Empowerment of entrepreneurs' Branch association  
The most important action in improving the role of branch associations is transferring to them 
some of government responsibilities in steering economic development in the sectors  
(licensing, control over conformity with standards, elaboration of developmental strategies, 
qualification programs, etc.). The improved institutional capacities of branch associations are 
precondition for such actions, but the problems in this area should not be used as justification 
of excessive government interference in the economy.  
 
TIMING 
 
We believe that there is a favorable window of opportunity the proposed action to be carried 
out and it comprises the remaining two and half years before Bulgaria membership in EU in 
2007. This window of opportunity is validated also by the political and financial 
stabilizations in the country and moderate economic growth during the last several years. It 
provided condition for the innovative SME in different sectors to stabilize their industrial 
capacities, human resources and to improve their knowledge base. Taken under these 
circumstances, the proposed actions will boost their productivity and competitiveness, which 
eventually will help their survival and growth at European and global market.  
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FINANCIAL RESOURCES NEEDED  
 
The proposed policy in support of the innovative entrepreneurship in Bulgaria relies on 
multiple sources of funding. We consider appropriate for the Government to allocate a 
limited resources playing the role of ‘seed capital’, encouraging other stakeholders to invest 
in those actions and measure they consider most suitable for their needs. The best way for 
allocation of public resources might be in form of specific project under one of EU accession 
programs – Phare, Programs for Regional Development, etc. Branch associations, local 
governments, Universities and Government research laboratories are among the potential 
source of funding, not only in money but also in kind.   
In such arrangement the key issue becomes coordination of efforts. We believe that such 
coordination could be carried out by a small Task Forces on Sector-Specific Innovation 
Policy Strategies. The Task Force could be the core of project jointly funded by Bulgarian 
Government and EU accession program. It should be operative for a fixed period of time 
(three years), with clear measurable objectives and limited staff. 
 
COMMUNICATIONS 
 
Together with research report, this policy paper will be published as booklet and circulated 
first among branch associations in the sectors of information & communication technologies 
and perfumery & cosmetics. They have been circulated among limited number of experts and 
entrepreneurs which have had input. At two of branch associations, we have been working 
with closely, panels are planned to discuses the policy proposal.   
Presentations of the present policy ideas have been given in the framework of series of expert 
meetings “Socialists and entrepreneurs”, organized by political movement “Social 
democrats” in the spring of 2004. In addition to that, a number of publications are planed in 
specialized business press. Contacts with relevant government and political experts have been 
established and they manifested some interest. 
Based on his experience, the author expects some of branch associations to become the main 
engines in promoting the ideas developed in this paper.  
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